Readings Blog Post – International History, 1900 – 1990
Sep 16th, 2009 by gswee
Hi everyone, here’s my contribution for tomorrow’s reading. My apologies for its stream of consciousness style, but I don’t apologise for the British spelling. =P Hope it’s useful.
Aims of this Post
1. To use the history presented in this chapter to draw links to, and make some comments about:
a. Concepts presented in earlier readings
b. Certain contexts relevant to myself, which have helped me in my understanding of the aforementioned concepts and history.
2. To comment on, and hopefully, generate discussion on the concept of nationalism.
Outline of the Reading
3. This chapter provides a brief outline of the key international events of the 20th Century, which the author opines have provided a basis for the international political order today. The author has classified these events into three main categories:
a. Development of the concept of ‘total war’ (key events include World War I and World War II);
b. The end of European imperialism and empire post-1945;
c. The different stages of the Cold War (including the nuclear arms race).
My Opinion on the Reading
4. This chapter is useful insofar as it provides a context for certain concepts explored in International Politics (e.g. Balance of Power theory). I particularly appreciate the author’s consciousness of the debates surrounding the interpretations of certain events – demonstrating his recognition that history is about the interpretation of past events and is therefore open to contention arising from different perspectives. This reading made particular sense to me when used as a context for certain concepts covered in previous readings, as will hopefully be adequately explored below.
Detailed Commentary
5. Liberal Democracy vs. Stability. The author argues that the Great Depression of 1929 was a key factor which encouraged the rise of alternative forms of government (e.g. Facist, Nazi, Communist) in Europe. He further states that economic and political instability provided the basis for Hitler’s rise. My understanding of his argument here is that in situations of relative economic weakness, people are more attracted to the pragmatism of political stability than the ideals (or idealism) of liberal democracy (e.g. ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ as espoused in the French Revolution). Such was broadly the case for Japanese militarism after the Meiji Restoration, and this argument is often used by some governments to justify their behaviour. Singapore, my home country, might be one such example.
6. Arguments that the Singaporean / ‘Asian’ form of democracy is different from, and therefore need not conform to, Western ideals aside, politicians in Singapore’s ruling party have long valued pragmatism (in the form of economic prosperity) over certain features of society the West has come to take for granted. In its election campaigns, the People’s Action Party (PAP) often stresses its track record in terms of economic growth, low unemployment rates, and Singapore’s rising affluence. When examined closely, this purported pragmatism might actually belie a deeper understanding of pragmatism on the part of the PAP: that Singaporeans would rather enjoy economic stability and its benefits (education, purchasing power, home ownership, healthcare) over ‘idealistic’ civil liberties such as free speech. Thus far, this seems to hold true, with the PAP returning to power every single election since 1959.
7. In A World Without the West (Barma et al, 2007), the authors argue that “the Chinese have essentially adopted liberal individualism as an economic ideology in fullblown form. But they have done so without the democratic political component that Americans take for granted.” This concept seems to echo the concept mentioned above.
8. Three Levels of Analysis. In this section, I will attempt to draw links to concepts articulated in The Three Levels of Analysis: A Framework for the Study of International Politics (Spanier and Wendzel, 1993).
a. International System-level Analysis. The author suggests that idea of collective security was a basis for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949, as well as other non-State actors like the United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations. Similar to the idea of the Balance of Power, any state’s attempt to increase its power will be restrained (or counteracted) by other state(s). This balance of power was the crux of the nuclear arms race, and some even argue that ironically, this build-up of nuclear arms contributed to détente when both superpowers realised that it would simply be catastrophic if the balance of power were upset, resulting in nuclear war.
| The author states that the League of Nations was ineffective in controlling the Italian invasion of Abyssinia post World War I. |
| Question: To what extent are international organisations (such as the UN) powerful? |
| To me, the UN’s use of economic sanctions as a demonstration of power (such as in its dealings with Myanmar and North Korea), as well as China’s economic influence in African states (as described in A World Without The West) – are but two sides of the same coin. In the first instance, the UN is brandishing the economic ‘stick’, while China is offering the economic ‘carrot’ in the second. Ultimately, both instances seem to point towards using economic tools as a currency of power. This seems to me as the UN’s recognition of pragmatism as described in A World Without The West. Another regional organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), seems to echo the values as described in its policy of non-interference in member states’ domestic affairs, instead focusing on economic co-operation. |
b. Actor-level Analysis. The reading demonstrates that at the actor-level, the domestic context of a state should not be neglected in an analysis of its decision. Scott argues that America’s ‘window of vulnerability’ and its perceived weakened influence during the détente of the Nixon and Carter administrations, led, in part, to the reactionary and confrontational tone of the Reagan administration. This seems consistent with Spanier et al’s assertion that democratic states are answerable, and therefore sensitive, to public opinion.
c. Decision-level Analysis. Finally, at the decision-level, the personal attributes and qualities of leaders cause an impact on international relations. Scott states that, beyond reacting to public opinion, Reagan made ‘incautious public remarks’, was ‘ill informed’, and was ‘disinterested in agreements that would freeze the status quo for the sake for agreements.’ The author argues that these attributes of the American president contributed, at least in part, to the advent of the Second Cold War.
9. Nationalism as a powerful driving force. In the reading, the author shows how national identity, if not nationalism, was a major cause of German dissatisfaction with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, leading eventually to its expansionistic ambitions. Later on, he tells of how nationalistic ambitions of colonies led, in part, to Britain’s relinquishment of its empire.
| Question: What makes you American? What makes me Singaporean? |
Nationalism – a sense of pride in one’s culture, identity and way-of-life (my crude definition) – is to me an important factor in international politics, in that it often provides an emotional impetus for actions by actors. Certain regimes even make use of this national pride to foster certain aims. Take Singapore, for example. Singapore can hardly be said to be ethnically or culturally-diverse from its closest neighbour in Southeast Asia, Malaysia. In fact, this similar background was one reason for Singapore’s short-lived merger with Malaysia between 1963 and 1965. Yet, after separation, the Singapore government has often sought to create a “uniquely Singaporean” identity. Would this be for the sake of giving its regime legitimacy? Or more importantly, would this be for the sake of justifying its policies?
Mandatory military service for all males in Singapore, for example, is argued by our leaders as a key strategy to the nation-state’s right to self-determination. One line from the army’s repertoire of marching songs goes:
Have you ever wondered,
Why must we serve?
Because we love our land,
and we want it to be free to be free!
My point is, nationalism is a potent instrument, and when it is effectively used, may justify or provide the impetus for actors’ decisions. Think “Global War on Terror”.
For more of what I mean, check out this site.
10. Moral Stature. Spanier et al also argue that for a liberal democracy to go to war, an act against its purported values, there must be a “wholesome, ennobling and morally-transcending goal”. Scott argues that part of the reason why European powers relinquished their colonies was that the democratic belief in self-determination was in contrast with the act of imperialism. In other words, Britain, France and the other European nations let go of their empires because of their “wholesome, ennobling and morally-transcending” nature. To me, this is a bigoted and ironic claim – to begin with, these powers often justified their annexation of these areas with what was then a “wholesome, ennobling and morally-transcending” claim – the White Man’s Burden, when in fact they sought to benefit themselves (raw materials, export markets… the list goes on!). Would Great Britain’s release of the “jewel in her crown”, India, have been so acrimonious had they been as morally robust as the author claims? Elsewhere in the chapter, Scott admits: “American commitment to liberal democracy and national self-determination was often subordinated to Cold War perspectives, as well as US economic and political interests.”
One Clarification
11. Before I conclude, I would like to point out one area of ambiguity in the reading:
“British withdrawal from Africa was relatively peaceful, save for conflicts with indigenous revolutionaries, notably in Kenya (1952 – 56) and Malaya (1948 – 60).”
Do note that Malaya (the precursor to today’s Federation of Malaysia) was a Southeast Asian state, and not in Africa.
Recommendation
12. I recommend constant referencing to previous readings when attempting this chapter. By itself, it is little more than a slightly dull narrative; set against a wider context, however, it proved to be a thought provoking and ultimately enjoyable read for me. Enjoy!
This is a great comment on a reading that goes far beyond what I expect these reading posts to be!
A question about your comment regarding ASEAN. Is it possible to have a true policy of non-interference? Isn’t economic cooperation ultimately going to involve some degree of interference? If we promise to all lower trade barriers, for instance, don’t some economies risk finding themselves relatively uncompetitive in certain sectors? And doesn’t that in turn mean that certain businesses could fail within certain countries?
I agree with your point that ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’ may not be as clear-cut as the term suggests. That said, I think ultimately organisations such as ASEAN aim to find specific areas in which economic co-operation would bring about mutual benefits. It is true that intervention (or perhaps involvement) in another state’s domestic affairs would come about with any economic interaction – off the top of my head I think of how the Fast Food Empire has impacted agriculture across many countries. That said, however, I think my point about ASEAN is that its form of co-operation strives particularly to avoid direct intervention in another state’s governance.
I am glad to read about this issue.
I agree with your point that ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’ This is a great comment on a reading that goes far beyond what I expect these reading posts to be!